Cryptanalytic Attack on Cryptographic Sequence Generators: The Class of Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators

  • Authors:
  • A. Fúster-Sabater;P. Caballero-Gil

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute of Applied Physics, C.S.I.C., Madrid, Spain 28006;Department of Statistics, Operations Research and Computing Faculty of Mathematics, University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain 38271

  • Venue:
  • ICCSA '08 Proceedings of the international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications, Part II
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The shrinking generator is a very popular sequence generator with cryptographic applications. Nowadays, it is still considered as a secure keystream generator. In this work, it is shown that the knowledge of only a low number of generated bits is sufficient to break it. Indeed, whereas the linear complexity of the generated sequence (the shrunken sequence) is bounded by A·2(S茂戮驴 2)LC≤ A·2(S茂戮驴 1)(Aand Sbeing the lengths of the two component registers), we claim that the generator can be cryptanalyzed with the knowledge of A·Sintercepted bits and simple computations. Such a result is proven thanks to the definition of the shrunken sequences as a particular kind of interleaved sequences. A similar attack can be extended to any other generator of the class of clock-controlled shrinking generators. Furthermore, this paper confirms that certain bits of the interleaved sequences have a greater strategic importance than others, which must be considered as a proof of weakness of interleaved sequence generators regarding their use in cryptography.