Pseudo-random generation from one-way functions
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The computational complexity of universal hashing
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An identity-based key-exchange protocol
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A provably-secure strongly-randomized cipher
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Proactive public key and signature systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improved Non-committing Encryption Schemes Based on a General Complexity Assumption
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Hyper-encryption against Space-Bounded Adversaries from On-Line Strong Extractors
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Exposure-resilient cryptography
Exposure-resilient cryptography
Design principles and patterns for computer systems that are simultaneously secure and usable
Design principles and patterns for computer systems that are simultaneously secure and usable
Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Robust threshold DSS signatures
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Adaptively secure threshold cryptography: introducing concurrency, removing erasures
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Exposure-resilient functions and all-or-nothing transforms
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Protecting secret data from insider attacks
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Intrusion-Resilience via the bounded-storage model
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Perfectly secure password protocols in the bounded retrieval model
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
A Leakage-Resilient Mode of Operation
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Erasing old data and keys is an important tool in cryptographic protocol design. It is useful in many settings, including proactive security, adaptive security, forward security, and intrusion resilience. Protocols for all these settings typically assume the ability to perfectly eraseinformation. Unfortunately, as amply demonstrated in the systems literature, perfect erasures are hard to implement in practice.We propose a model of partial erasureswhere erasure instructions leave almost all the data erased intact, thus giving the honest players only a limited capability for disposing of old data. Nonetheless, we provide a general compiler that transforms any secure protocol using perfect erasures into one that maintains the same security properties when only partial erasures are available. The key idea is a new redundant representation of secret data which can still be computed on, and yet is rendered useless when partially erased. We prove that any such a compiler must incur a cost in additional storage, and that our compiler is near optimal in terms of its storage overhead.