Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms
CEC '05 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Characterizing unstructured overlay topologies in modern P2P file-sharing systems
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
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Many researchers have used game theory to study the problem of encouraging cooperation in peer-to-peer and mobile ad hocnetworks, where resources are provided collectively by the users. Previous work has modelled the problem as either a multi-player social dilemma or a network of two-player prisoner's dilemmas, but neither of these approaches captures a crucial aspect of the problem, namely scarcity: when resources are limited, players must not only consider how to establish and sustain cooperation with each opponent, but how to allocate resources among their opponents in order to maximise the total cooperation received.This paper presents a new game theoretic model of cooperation under scarcity, the sharer's dilemma, and a simple expected utility strategythat is shown to perform well against a wide range of opponents. The expected utility strategy can easily be applied to file sharing networks to create an incentive for users to contribute resources.