An Efficient Anonymous Credential System

  • Authors:
  • Norio Akagi;Yoshifumi Manabe;Tatsuaki Okamoto

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Social Informatics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University,;Department of Social Informatics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, and NTT Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation,;Department of Social Informatics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, and NTT Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation,

  • Venue:
  • Financial Cryptography and Data Security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

This paper presents an efficient anonymous credential system that includes two variants. One is a system that lacks a credential revoking protocol, but provides perfect anonymity-unlinkability and computational unforgeability under the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. It is more efficient than existing credential systems with no revocation. The other is a system that provides revocation as well as computational anonymity-unlinkability and unforgeability under the strong Diffie-Hellman and decision linear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. This system provides two types of revocation simultaneously: one is to blacklist a user who acted wrong so that he can no longer use his credential, and the other is identifying a user who acted wrong from his usage of credential. Both systems are provably secure under the above-mentioned assumptions in the standard model.