Making Quantitative Measurements of Privacy/Analysis Tradeoffs Inherent to Packet Trace Anonymization

Authors:
William Yurcik;Clay Woolam;Greg Hellings;Latifur Khan;Bhavani Thuraisingham
Affiliations:
University of Texas at Dallas,;University of Texas at Dallas,;University of Texas at Dallas,;University of Texas at Dallas,;University of Texas at Dallas,
Venue:
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Anonymization provides a mechanism for sharing data while obscuring private/sensitive values within the shared data. However, anonymization for sharing also sets up a fundamental tradeoff --- the stronger the anonymization protection, the less information remains for analysis. This privacy/analysis tradeoff has been descriptively acknowledged by many researchers but no one has yet attempted to quantify this tradeoff. We perform anonymization options on network packet traces and make empirical measurements using IDS alarms as an indicator for security analysis capability. Preliminary results show most packet fields have unexpected complex tradeoffs while only two fields exhibiting the classic zero sum tradeoff.