Distributed Relay Protocol for Probabilistic Information-Theoretic Security in a Randomly-Compromised Network

Authors:
Travis R. Beals;Barry C. Sanders
Affiliations:
Department of Physics, University of California, Berkeley, USA 94720;Institute for Quantum Information Science, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4
Venue:
ICITS '08 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information Theoretic Security
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We introduce a simple, practical approach with probabilistic information-theoretic security to mitigate one of quantum key distribution's major limitations: the short maximum transmission distance (~200 km) possible with present day technology. Our scheme uses classical secret sharing techniques to allow secure transmission over long distances through a network containing randomly-distributed compromised nodes. The protocol provides arbitrarily high confidence in the security of the protocol, and modest scaling of resource costs with improvement of the security parameter. Although some types of failure are undetectable, users can take preemptive measures to make the probability of such failures arbitrarily small.