A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A zero-one law for Boolean privacy
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Privacy and communication complexity
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Security of quantum protocols against coherent measurements
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Quantum circuits with mixed states
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The All-or-Nothing Nature of Two-Party Secure Computation
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Equivalence Between Two Flavours of Oblivious Transfers
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Quantum Bit Commitment and Coin Tossing Protocols
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Information theoretic reductions among disclosure problems
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A quantum bit commitment scheme provably unbreakable by both parties
SFCS '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science
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In secure two-party function evaluation Alice holding initially a secret input xand Bob having a secret input ycommunicate to determine a prescribed function f(x, y) in such a way that after the computation Bob learns f(x, y) but nothing more about xother than he could deduce from yand f(x,y) alone, and Alice learns nothing. Unconditionally secure function evaluation is known to be essentially impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper we introduce a new, weakened, model for security in two-party quantum computations. In our model --- we call it susceptible function computation --- if one party learns something about the input of the other one with advantage 茂戮驴then the probability that the correct value f(x,y) is computed, when the protocol completes, is at most 1 茂戮驴 茂戮驴(茂戮驴), for some function 茂戮驴of 茂戮驴. Thus, this model allows to measure the trade-off between the advantage of a dishonest party and the error induced by its attack. Furthermore, we present a protocol for computing the one-out-of-two oblivious transfer function that achieves a quadratic trade-off i.e. 茂戮驴= 茂戮驴(茂戮驴2).