Key-Recovery Attacks on Universal Hash Function Based MAC Algorithms

  • Authors:
  • Helena Handschuh;Bart Preneel

  • Affiliations:
  • Spansion, Levallois-Perret Cedex, France 92684;Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium B-3001 and IBBT, Van Crommenlaan, Gent B-9000

  • Venue:
  • CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

This paper discusses key recovery and universal forgery attacks on several MAC algorithms based on universal hash functions. The attacks use a substantial number of verification queries but eventually allow for universal forgeries instead of existential or multiple forgeries. This means that the security of the algorithms completely collapses once a few forgeries are found. Some of these attacks start off by exploiting a weak key property, but turn out to become full-fledged divide and conquer attacks because of the specific structure of the universal hash functions considered. Partial information on a secret key can be exploited too, in the sense that it renders some key recovery attacks practical as soon as a few key bits are known. These results show that while universal hash functions offer provable security, high speeds and parallelism, their simple combinatorial properties make them less robust than conventional message authentication primitives.