Protecting Respondents' Identities in Microdata Release
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
The inference problem: a survey
ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Access control to information in pervasive computing environments
HOTOS'03 Proceedings of the 9th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems - Volume 9
Location privacy protection through obfuscation-based techniques
Proceedings of the 21st annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security
Quantifying privacy violations
SDM'11 Proceedings of the 8th VLDB international conference on Secure data management
Privacy consensus in anonymization systems via game theory
DBSec'12 Proceedings of the 26th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy
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One of the approaches to the problem of data-privacy protection is given by the application of obfuscation techniques; in many situations, however, context information can help an attacker to perform inference over obfuscated data and to refine the estimate of the sensitive data up to a violation of the original privacy requirements. We consider the problem in a location privacy protection set-up where the sensitive attribute to be protected is the position of a Location Based Service user, and where the location anonymization technique is cloaking, whereas the context, supporting inference attacks, consists in some landscape-related information, namely positional constraints. In this work we adopt the assumption that the anonymizer and the attacker are two rational agents and frame the problem in a game theoretical approach by modeling the contest as a two-player, zero-sum, signaling game, then we point to the corresponding equilibrium solution and show that, when the anonymizer plays the equilibrium strategies, the advantage provided to the attacker by a non-neutral landscape gets canceled. We suggest that the game theoretical solution could be used as a reference solution for inter-technique comparisons.