On the Design Dilemma in Dining Cryptographer Networks

Authors:
Jens O. Oberender;Hermann Meer
Affiliations:
Faculty of Informatics and Mathematics, Chair of Computer Networks and Computer Communications,;Faculty of Informatics and Mathematics, Chair of Computer Networks and Computer Communications, and University of Passau, Institute of IT-Security and Security Law, Germany
Venue:
TrustBus '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
Year:
2008

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Abstract

In a Dining Cryptographers network, the anonymity level raises with the number of participating users. This paper studies strategic behavior based on game theory. Strategic user behavior can cause sudden changes to the number of system participants and, in consequence, degrade anonymity. This is caused by system parameters that influence strategic behavior. Additionally, conflicting goals of participants result in dilemma games. Properties of message coding, e.g. collision robustness and disrupter identification, change the game outcome by preventing dilemmas and, therefore, enhance anonymity. Properties of anonymity metrics are proposed that allow for strategic user behavior.