Nomad: A Security Model with Non Atomic Actions and Deadlines
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Security Model for OLSR MANET Protocol
MDM '06 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Mobile Data Management
Modeling Software VulnerabilitiesWith Vulnerability Cause Graphs
ICSM '06 Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance
Self-monitoring security in ad hoc routing
ADHOC-NOW'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks
An EFSM-based intrusion detection system for ad hoc networks
ATVA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
Monitoring end-to-end connectivity in mobile ad-hoc networks
ICN'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Networking - Volume Part II
Hash chains at the basis of a secure reactive routing protocol
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
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Ad hoc networks are exposed more than traditional networks to security threats due to their mobility and open architecture aspects. In addition, any dysfunction due to badly configured nodes can severely affect the network as all nodes participate in the routing task. For these reasons, it is important to check the validity of ad hoc protocols, to verify whether the running implementation is conform to its specification and to detect security flows in the network. In this paper, we propose a formal methodology to collect and analyze the network traffic trace. Observers running on a set of nodes collect local traces and send them later to a global observer that correlates them into a global trace thanks to an adapted time synchronization mechanism running in the network. The global trace is then analyzed to study the conformance and the security of the running routing protocol. This analysis is performed using dedicated algorithms that check the collected trace against a set of functional and security properties specified in an adapted formal language.