ASN.1 complete
Symbolic execution and program testing
Communications of the ACM
Secure Execution via Program Shepherding
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Minos: Control Data Attack Prevention Orthogonal to Memory Model
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
Polygraph: Automatically Generating Signatures for Polymorphic Worms
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
On deriving unknown vulnerabilities from zero-day polymorphic and metamorphic worm exploits
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards Automatic Generation of Vulnerability-Based Signatures
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
LIFT: A Low-Overhead Practical Information Flow Tracking System for Detecting Security Attacks
Proceedings of the 39th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
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With the increased popularity of polymorphic and register spring attacks, exploit signatures intrusion detection systems (IDS) can no longer rely only on exploit signatures. Vulnerability signatures that pattern match based on properties of the vulnerability instead of the exploit should be employed. Recent research has proposed three classes of vulnerability signatures but its approach cannot address complex vulnerabilities such as the ASN.1 Double-Free. Here we introduce Petri nets as a new class of vulnerability signature that could potentially be used to detect other types of vulnerabilities. Petri nets can be automatically generated and are represented as a graph making it easier to understand and debug. We analyzed it along side the three other classes of vulnerability signatures in relation to the Windows ASN.1 vulnerability. The results were very promising due to the very low false positive rate and 0% false negative rate. We have shown that Petri nets are a very efficient, concise, and effective way of describing signatures (both vulnerability and exploit). They are more powerful than regular expressions and still efficient enough to be practical. Comparing with the other classes, only Turing machines provided a better identification rate but they incur significant performance overhead.