Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
System Description: Twelf - A Meta-Logical Framework for Deductive Systems
CADE-16 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
Proving Security Protocols Correct
LICS '99 Proceedings of the 14th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Games and the impossibility of realizable ideal functionality
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
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We show how a type of atoms, which behave like urelements, and a new proposition that expresses the independence of a term from an atom can be added to any logical system after imposing minor restrictions on definitions and computations. Working in constructive type theory, we give rules for the independence proposition and show how cryptographic protocols can be modeled as automata exchanging atoms. This model provides a unifying framework for reasoning about security and allows us to combine a general model of computation with a simple model of acquisition of secret information. As an application, we prove a fundamental property of nonces that justifies the axioms for nonces used in the protocol composition logic (PCL) of Datta, Derek, Mitchell and Roy. The example shows that basic security properties are naturally expressed in terms of independence and the causal ordering of events. The rules and example proofs are fully implemented in the Nuprl proof development system.