Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
On concepts of directional differentiability
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
A nonsmooth version of Newton's method
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Convergence analysis of some algorithms for solving nonsmooth equations
Mathematics of Operations Research
Strong Stability in Variational Inequalities
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
Solution of monotone complementarity problems with locally Lipschitzian functions
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B - Special issue on computational nonsmooth optimization
Equilibrium programming using proximal-like algorithms
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Regularity Properties of a Semismooth Reformulation of Variational Inequalities
SIAM Journal on Optimization
Semismooth homeomorphisms and strong stability of semidefinite and Lorentz complementarity problems
Mathematics of Operations Research
Gap Functions for Equilibrium Problems
Journal of Global Optimization
Approximations of Nash equilibria
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems and Newton methods
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Computational Optimization and Applications
Game-Theoretic analysis of internet switching with selfish users
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
Operations Research Letters
A further result on an implicit function theorem for locally Lipschitz functions
Operations Research Letters
Penalty Methods for the Solution of Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
SIAM Journal on Optimization
SIAM Journal on Optimization
Computational Optimization and Applications
A globalized Newton method for the computation of normalized Nash equilibria
Journal of Global Optimization
Computational Optimization and Applications
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The generalized Nash equilibrium problem is a Nash game which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows the strategy sets of each player to depend on the decision variables of all other players. It was recently shown by the authors that this generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as both an unconstrained and a constrained optimization problem with continuously differentiable objective functions. This paper further investigates these approaches and shows, in particular, that the objective functions are SC1-functions. Moreover, conditions for the local superlinear convergence of a Newton-type method being applied to the unconstrained optimization reformulation are also given. Some numerical results indicate that this method works quite well on a number of problems coming from different application areas.