Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Geography-informed energy conservation for Ad Hoc routing
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Friends and Foes: Preventing Sel.shness in Open Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
ICDCSW '03 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
FAIR: Fee Arbitrated Incentive Architecture in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
RTAS '04 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium
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In wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes are routers that are required to forward packets for each other. Undoubtedly, nodes that forward more packets will run out of power before others will. To save energy, some nodes may become selfish and refuse to forward packets. As a result, the overall system performance will be degraded with the increased number of selfish nodes. This problem is more severe in networks that employ a wake-sleep schedule for energy savings (e.g., GAF-based networks). Even if a few of active nodes (leader nodes in GAF) are selfish, such a network may be virtually partitioned. Therefore, we propose two schemes to detect and to punish selfish nodes as well as to reduce the possibility of virtual network partition: SWD and GAFSWD. In SWD, only GAF-leader nodes are watchdogs. This watchdog concept is further developed into GAFSWD whereby non-leader nodes take turn to be additional watchdogs for detecting selfish nodes and to be candidates for alternative routes when needed. The results indicate that our schemes achieve significantly better fair ratio and delivery ratio while incurring small false conviction under investigated scenarios.