King: estimating latency between arbitrary internet end hosts
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
Is the round-trip time correlated with the number of packets in flight?
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
The design and implementation of a next generation name service for the internet
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Queue - DNS
Perils of transitive trust in the domain name system
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
CoDNS: improving DNS performance and reliability via cooperative lookups
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
Advanced White List Approach for Preventing Access to Phishing Sites
ICCIT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Convergence Information Technology
DepenDNS: Dependable Mechanism against DNS Cache Poisoning
CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Netalyzr: illuminating the edge network
IMC '10 Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
A centralized monitoring infrastructure for improving DNS security
RAID'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Secure naming in information-centric networks
Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the Internet Workshop
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
Quantifying DNS namespace influence
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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We describe a novel, practical and simple technique to make DNS queries more resistant to poisoning attacks: mix the upper and lower case spelling of the domain name in the query. Fortuitously, almost all DNS authority servers preserve the mixed case encoding of the query in answer messages. Attackers hoping to poison a DNS cache must therefore guess the mixed-case encoding of the query, in addition to all other fields required in a DNS poisoning attack. This increases the difficulty of the attack. We describe and measure the additional protections realized by this technique. Our analysis includes a basic model of DNS poisoning, measurement of the benefits that come from case-sensitive query encoding, implementation of the system for recursive DNS servers, and large-scale real-world experimental evaluation. Since the benefits of our technique can be significant, we have simultaneously made this DNS encoding system a proposed IETF standard. Our approach is practical enough that, just weeks after its disclosure, it is being implemented by numerous DNS vendors.