Traps, events, emulation, and enforcement: managing the yin and yang of virtualization-based security

  • Authors:

  • Sergey Bratus;Michael E. Locasto;Ashwin Ramaswamy;Sean W. Smith

  • Affiliations:

  • Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA;Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA;Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA;Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Virtual machine security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We question current trends that attempt to leverage virtualization techniques to achieve security goals. We suggest that the security role of a virtual machine centers on being a policy interpreter rather than a resource provider. These two roles (security reference monitor and resource emulator) are currently conflated within the context of virtual machines and VMMs. We believe that this ``double-duty'' leads to both a significant performance impact as well as a bloated virtualization layer. Increased complexity reduces confidence that the code is elementary enough to verify or trust from a security perspective. Ironically, as more security-related functionality is shoved into a VM platform, the system becomes less trustworthy as it becomes increasingly trusted. We argue that a principle reason for such an unfortunate situation is the lack of efficient hardware trapping mechanisms. We propose an architecture to help ameliorate this problem by transferring the security enforcement and program analysis roles from the virtualization component to a policy-directed FPGA.