What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
Information ethics: On the philosophical foundation ofcomputer ethics
Ethics and Information Technology
The uniqueness debate in computer ethics: What exactly is at issue, and why does it matter?
Ethics and Information Technology
On the intrinsic value of informationobjects and the infosphere
Ethics and Information Technology
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information
Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence
Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Minds and Machines
Towards an ontological foundation of information ethics
Ethics and Information Technology
Information technologies and the tragedy of the Good Will
Ethics and Information Technology
Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives
Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives
Floridi's Philosophy of Information and Information Ethics: Current Perspectives, Future Directions
The Information Society - The Philosophy of Information, its Nature, and Future Developments
Infosphere to Ethosphere: Moral Mediators in the Nonviolent Transformation of Self and World
International Journal of Technoethics
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The paper presents a critical appraisal of Floridi's metaphysical foundation of information ecology. It highlights some of the issues raised by Floridi with regard to the axiological status of the objects in the "infosphere," the moral status of artificial agents, and Floridi's foundation of information ethics as information ecology. I further criticise the ontological conception of value as a first order category. I suggest that a weakening of Floridi's demiurgic information ecology is needed in order not to forget the limitations of human actors and/or of their surrogates, digital agents. I plea for a rational theoretical and practical view of such agents beyond utopian reasoning with regard to their potential moral status.