Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
DIMSUMNet: New Directions in Wireless Networking Using Coordinated Dynamic Spectrum Access
WOWMOM '05 Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Symposium on World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks
Synchronous and asynchronous auction models for dynamic spectrum access
ICDCN'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
Dynamic spectrum management for next-generation DSL systems
IEEE Communications Magazine
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Fair profit allocation in the spectrum auction using the Shapley value
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
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With the increasing demands for radio spectrum, techniques are being explored that would allow dynamic access of spectrum bands that are underutilized. In this regard, a new paradigm called dynamic spectrum access is being investigated where wireless service providers (WSPs) would dynamically seek more spectrum from the under-utilized licensed bands when and where they need without interfering with the primary users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic allocation will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In this paper, we consider the dynamic spectrum allocation process where multiple WSPs (bidders) compete to acquire necessary spectrum band from a common pool of spectrum. We use auction theory to analyze the allocation process when the demand from WSPs exceeds the available spectrum. We investigate various auction mechanisms under different spectrum allocation constraints to find WSPs' bidding strategies and revenue generated by spectrum owner. We show that sequential bidding of bands provides better result than the concurrent bidding when WSPs are constrained to at most single unit allocation. On the other hand, when the bidders request for multiple units, (i.e., they are not restricted by allocation constraints) synchronous auction mechanism proves to be beneficial than asynchronous auctions.