An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On k-connectivity for a geometric random graph
Random Structures & Algorithms
On the minimum node degree and connectivity of a wireless multihop network
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On Random Intersection Graphs: The Subgraph Problem
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
Revisiting random key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
The vertex degree distribution of random intersection graphs
Random Structures & Algorithms - Isaac Newton Institute Programme “Computation, Combinatorics and Probability”: Part I
Expansion properties of (secure) wireless networks
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We show that massive attacks against sensor networks that use random key pre-distribution schemes cannot be cheap, provided that the parameters are set in the right way. By choosing them appropriately, any adversary whose aim is to compromise a large fraction of the communication links is forced, with overwhelming probability, to capture a large fraction of the nodes. This holds regardless of the information available to the adversary to select the nodes. We consider two important security properties: We say that the network is unassailable if the adversary cannot compromise a linear fraction of the communication links by compromising a sub-linear fraction of the nodes, and that the network is unsplittable if the adversary cannot partition the network into two (or more) linear size fragments. We show how to set the relevant parameters of random key pre-distribution---pool and key ring size---in such a way that the network is not only connected, but also provably unassailable and unsplittable with high probability. Moreover, we also show how to set the parameters in such a way to form a giant component in the network, a connected subgraph including, say, 99% of the sensors. Giant components emerge by using much smaller key rings, are sparse, and, quite remarkably, are provably unassailable and unsplittable as well. All these results are supported by experiments.