Efficient dispersal of information for security, load balancing, and fault tolerance
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Practical loss-resilient codes
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Digital signatures for flows and multicasts
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
The BiBa one-time signature and broadcast authentication protocol
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient multicast stream authentication using erasure codes
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Expander Graphs for Digital Stream Authentication and Robust Overlay Networks
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure Broadcast Communication in Wired and Wireless Networks
Secure Broadcast Communication in Wired and Wireless Networks
Efficient Authentication and Signing of Multicast Streams over Lossy Channels
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Graph-Based Authentication of Digital Streams
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Computation, Memory and Bandwidth Efficient Distillation Codes to Mitigate DoS in Multicast
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Lightweight, pollution-attack resistant multicast authentication scheme
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Hierarchies of keys in secure multicast communications
Journal of Computer Security
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One of the main challenges of securing broadcast communications is source authentication: to allow each receiver to verify the origin of the data. An ideal broadcast authentication protocol should be efficient for the sender and the receiver, have a small communication overhead, allow the receiver to authenticate each individual packet as soon as it is received (i.e. no buffering on the receivers), provide perfect robustness to packet loss, and scale to a large number of receivers. In this paper we introduce PEAC, a probabilistic, efficient and resilient authentication protocol for broadcast communications. This new construction achieves all the above properties, with the tradeoff that it requires just loose time synchronization between the sender and the receivers. Due to its low communication overhead and minimal synchronization requirements, the scheme is particularly suitable for low-end resource constrained devices as well as applications that require to process the received messages in real time or quasi-real time fashion. For instance, a packet can be authenticated computing 12 hash only on both the sender and the receivers, while the packet forging probability is kept below 2-80. Finally, note that PEAC is completely customizable, allowing to trade-off security with a (small) overhead increase on the sender only, while not affecting the (small) overhead experienced by receivers.