Routing with guaranteed delivery in ad hoc wireless networks
Wireless Networks
GHT: a geographic hash table for data-centric storage
WSNA '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless sensor networks and applications
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On k-coverage in a mostly sleeping sensor network
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Reputation-based framework for high integrity sensor networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
TinySeRSync: secure and resilient time synchronization in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Localization in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information processing in sensor networks
Statistical en-route filtering of injected false data in sensor networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Data Centric Storage (DCS) is a well-known data storage and query processing mechanism for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), storing sensed data or their metadata at pre-specified locations. Queries issued by mobile users are sent to, and processed at, such storage nodes. However, securing DCS is very difficult because WSNs usually operate in an unattended environment and hence are subject to node-capture attacks. Even after capturing a single node, an attacker may be able to subvert the entire system by using the keying material extracted from the captured node. To remedy/alleviate the above problem, we propose Attack-Resilient Collaborative Message Authentication (ARCMA), in which sensor nodes collaboratively authenticate messages to be sent to, or received from, remote nodes. In ARCMA, each node belongs to one of k groups, and constructs an Authentication Tree (AT) which is formed with k nodes, each from a distinct group. Each node collaborates with the other nodes in its AT to authenticate messages. We propose two heuristics, called MIN and OPT, to construct ATs. Our analysis shows that the security of ARCMA does not degrade until the attacker capture k or more nodes. We also evaluate the overhead of constructing ATs and the cost of authenticating messages using ATs.