Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A Reputation-based Mechanism for Isolating Selfish Nodes in Ad Hoc Networks
MOBIQUITOUS '05 Proceedings of the The Second Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking and Services
STRUDEL: supporting trust in the dynamic establishment of peering coalitions
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Towards designing a trusted routing solution in mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Achieving cooperation in multihop wireless networks of selfish nodes
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
DARWIN: distributed and adaptive reputation mechanism for wireless ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
AINA '08 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications
Using game theory to analyze wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Understanding representational sensitivity in the iterated prisoner's dilemma with fingerprints
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Multimodal security enforcement framework for wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing: Connecting the World Wirelessly
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Every node in a wireless ad hoc network is both end host (it generates its own data and routing traffic) and infrastructure (it forwards traffic for others), but rational nodes have no incentive to cooperatively forward traffic for others, since this kind of forwarding is not costless. In this article, we use game theory to analyse cooperative mechanisms and derive optimal criteria in forwarding. Distinguished from previous works, we take the consideration of realistic scenarios such as noise, non-simultaneously, non-perfect measurement and different strategies by the nodes.