Another security improvement over the Lin et al.'s electronic-voting scheme

Authors:
Maryam Rajabzadeh Asaar;Javad Mohajeri;Mahmoud Salmasizadeh
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran 16844, Iran.;Electronics Research Center, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran 16844, Iran.;Electronics Research Center, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran 16844, Iran
Venue:
International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
Year:
2008

Citing 4
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Abstract

Lin, Hwang and Chang (2003) have proposed an electronic-voting scheme which can be utilised in large-scale elections, and claimed that it detects double voting. In this article, by presenting an attack, we show that voters can successfully vote more than once without being detected. Then, we propose a new modified scheme based on the Lin, Hwang and Chang's (2003) scheme with the same efficiency to solve this weakness and analyse its security.