The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Low latency mix networks such as onion routing (Tor), heavily utilize cryptographic operations for transmitting a message to the receiver resulting in substantial computational and communication overhead. To address the performance and security issues of low latency mix networks, we propose a novel anonymous routing scheme called C-Mix. Its design principles are inspired by network coding techniques and the properties of polynomial interpolation. Based on our security analysis and performance evaluations, C-Mix achieves same level of anonymity with comparable computation overhead in comparison to traditional low latency mix networks.