Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Computers, Chess, and Cognition
Computers, Chess, and Cognition
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Complexity of (iterated) dominance
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
On the Complexity of Two-PlayerWin-Lose Games
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The computational complexity of nash equilibria in concisely represented games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Competitive safety analysis: robust decision-making in multi-agent systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Current challenges in multi-player game search
CG'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Computers and Games
Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Ranking Games and Gambling: When to Quit When You're Ahead
Operations Research
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
Theoretical Computer Science
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The outcomes of many strategic situations such as parlor games or competitive economic scenarios are rankings of the participants, with higher ranks generally at least as desirable as lower ranks. Here we define ranking games as a class of n-player normal-form games with a payoff structure reflecting the players' von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over their individual ranks. We investigate the computational complexity of a variety of common game-theoretic solution concepts in ranking games and deliver hardness results for iterated weak dominance and mixed Nash equilibrium when there are more than two players, and for pure Nash equilibrium when the number of players is unbounded but the game is described succinctly. This dashes hope that multi-player ranking games can be solved efficiently, despite their profound structural restrictions. Based on these findings, we provide matching upper and lower bounds for three comparative ratios, each of which relates two different solution concepts: the price of cautiousness, the mediation value, and the enforcement value.