Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Reasoning about knowledge
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Speech acts, commitment and multi-agent communication
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
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Secure communication over a hostile network typically involves the use of cryptographic protocols that specify the precise order in which messages should be exchanged to achieve communicative goals. There has been a great deal of literature on the formal verification of cryptographic protocols, where the emphasis is on finding attacks that compromise the security of a given protocol. However, in the context of intelligence analysis, simply determining if an attack exists is not sufficient. Even in the absence of a known security flaw, we are still interested in monitoring communication and determining the goals of individuals that attempt to manipulate a protocol. By monitoring communication at this level, we are able to predict future attacks, deny service to offending parties, and determine which pieces of information are desirable to intruders on a particular network. In order to discern the goals of an intruder, we need to understand what an agent is attempting to achieve by sending a given message. In the context of cryptographic protocols, it is particularly important to understand what an agent is attempting to achieve by encrypting a specific message with a specific key. In this paper, we study the meaning of encrypted messages using tools imported from discourse analysis and Computational Intelligence. We demonstrate that explicitly specifying the communicative acts performed by encrypted messages allows us to uncover the goals of an intruder. The utility of this information is discussed.