Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
On the Efficient Scheduling of Non-Periodic Tasks in Hard Real-Time Systems
RTSS '99 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium
Adaptive Memory Allocations in Clusters to Handle Unexpectedly Large Data-Intensive Jobs
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Combinatorial Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Data enginering issues in E-commerce and services: In conjunction with ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '07)
Periodical Resource Allocation Using Approximated Combinatorial Auctions
IAT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Active Queue Management for Fair Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
An experimental analysis of biased parallel greedy approximation for combinatorial auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
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Combinatorial auctions are suitable mechanisms for efficient allocation of set of items for self-interested attendees such as software agents. Since optimal winner determination problem of combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, much work focuses on tackling the computational costs for winner determination. Since it is an important issue to guarantee the quality of approximated results, we have proposed desirable properties for such approximation algorithms. In this paper, we analyze the advantages and side-effects of preserving winner price monotonicity, one of our proposed desirable properties for approximation algorithms of combinatorial auctions.