A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Automata and Computability
Noninterference for concurrent programs and thread systems
Theoretical Computer Science
A Per Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs
Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation
Bebop: A Symbolic Model Checker for Boolean Programs
Proceedings of the 7th International SPIN Workshop on SPIN Model Checking and Software Verification
Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Analysis of Recursive State Machines
CAV '01 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Possibilistic Definitions of Security - An Assembly Kit
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A General Theory of Composition for Trace Sets Closed under Selective Interleaving Functions
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A general theory of security properties
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Decidability and proof systems for language-based noninterference relations
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Algorithmic Verification of Noninterference Properties
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
An Automata Based Approach for Verifying Information Flow Properties
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Model-checking trace-based information flow properties
Journal of Computer Security
The complexity of synchronous notions of information flow security
FOSSACS'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures
Deciding selective declassification of petri nets
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Conditional information flow policies and unwinding relations
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance about information flow security: the end-to-end behavior of a computing system. Noninterference is the basic semantical condition used to account for information flow security. In the literature, there are many definitions of noninterference: Non-inference, Separability and so on. Mantel presented a framework of Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) for characterizing the definitions of noninterference in the literature. Model-checking these BSPs for finite state systems was shown to be decidable in [8]. In this paper, we show that verifying these BSPs for the more expressive system model of pushdown systems is undecidable. We also give an example of a simple security property which is undecidable even for finite-state systems: the property is a weak form of non-inference called WNI, which is not expressible in Mantel's BSP framework.