Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Dark Side of "Black-Box" Cryptography, or: Should We Trust Capstone?
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Receipt-free electronic voting scheme with a tamper-resistant randomizer
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Verifiable internet voting solving secure platform problem
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
A practical voting scheme with receipts
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Internet voting will probably be one of the most significant achievements of the future information society. It will have an enormous impact on the election process making it fast, reliable and inexpensive. Nonetheless, so far the problem of providing security of remote voting is considered to be very difficult, as one has to take into account susceptibility of the voter's PC to various cyber-attacks. As a result, most of the research effort is put into developing protocols and machines for poll-site electronic voting. Although these solutions yield promising results, most of them cannot be directly applied to Internet voting because of the secure platform problem. However, the cryptographic components they utilize may be very useful in the context of remote voting, too. This paper presents a scheme based on combination of mixnets and homomorphic encryption borrowed from robust poll-site voting, along with techniques recommended for remote voting --- code sheets and test ballots. The protocol tries to minimize the trust put in voter's PC by employing paper ballots distributed before elections. The voter uses the ballot to submit an encrypted vote, which is illegible for the potentially corrupt PC. The creation of paper ballots, as well as the decryption of votes, is performed by a group of cooperating trusted servers. As a result, the scheme is characterized by strong asymmetry --- all computations are carried out on the server side. Hence, it does not require any additional hardware on the voter's side. Furthermore, the scheme offers distributed trust, receipt-freeness and verifiability.