Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions

Authors:
Dan Butnariu;Tomáš Kroupa
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, University of Haifa, 31 905 Haifa, Israel;Institute of Information Theory and Automation, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Pod Vodárenskou věží 4, 182 08 Prague, Czech Republic and Department of Mathematics, ...
Venue:
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Year:
2009

Citing 4
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Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new concept of solution for games with fuzzy coalitions, which we call an enlarged core. The enlarged core captures an idea that various groups of fuzzy coalitions can have different bargaining power or influence on the final distribution of wealth resulting from the cooperation process. We study a bargaining scheme for the enlarged core, which is an iterative procedure for generating sequences converging to elements of the enlarged core. It is shown that the enlarged core coincides with Aubin's core for a specific class of games with fuzzy coalitions.