Towards systematic evaluation of the evadability of bot/botnet detection methods

  • Authors:
  • Elizabeth Stinson;John C. Mitchell

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University;Stanford University

  • Venue:
  • WOOT'08 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on USENIX Workshop on offensive technologies
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Automated bot/botnet detection is a difficult problem given the high level of attacker power. We propose a systematic approach for evaluating the evadability of detection methods. An evasion tactic has two associated costs: implementation complexity and effect on botnet utility. An evasion tactic's implementation complexity is based on the ease with which bot writers can incrementally modify current bots to evade detection. Modifying a bot in order to evade a detection method may result in a less useful botnet; to explore this, we identify aspects of botnets that impact their revenue-generating capability. For concreteness, we survey some leading automated bot/botnet detection methods, identify evasion tactics for each, and assess the costs of these tactics. We also reconsider assumptions about botnet control that underly many botnet detection methods.