EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
An on-demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
Sensor-based intrusion detection for intra-domain distance-vector routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
WMCSA '02 Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
Beacon vector routing: scalable point-to-point routing in wireless sensornets
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
We present a secure routing protocol that is immune to Sybil attacks and that can tolerate collusion of Byzantine routers. It can tolerate either initial collusion of Byzantine routers or runtime collusion of non-adjacent Byzantine routers, both in the absence of runtime collusion between adjacent routers. For these settings, the calculated distance from a destination to a node is not smaller than the actual shortest distance from the destination to the node. The protocol can also simultaneously tolerate initial collusion of Byzantine routers and runtime collusion of adjacent Byzantine routers but in the absence of runtime collusion between non-adjacent routers. For this setting, it guarantees a bound on the difference between the calculated distance and the actual shortest distance. The bound depends on the number of Byzantine routers on a path. The protocol makes very weak timing assumptions and requires synchronization only between neighbors or second neighbors. We propose to use this protocol for secure localization of routers using hop-count distances, which can be then used as a proof of identity of nodes.