Selective families, superimposed codes, and broadcasting on unknown radio networks
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The do-all problem in broadcast networks
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
Optimal F-Reliable Protocols for the Do-All Problem on Single-Hop Wireless Networks
ISAAC '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
Round Robin is optimal for fault-tolerant broadcasting on wireless networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A Survey of Secure Wireless Ad Hoc Routing
IEEE Security and Privacy
Broadcast in radio networks tolerating byzantine adversarial behavior
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Broadcasting with locally bounded Byzantine faults
Information Processing Letters
On reliable broadcast in a radio network
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On selection problem in radio networks
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Feasibility and complexity of broadcasting with random transmission failures
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Efficient Byzantine Broadcast in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Reliable broadcast in radio networks: the bounded collision case
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Exploiting the capture effect for collision detection and recovery
EmNets '05 Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors
Reliable distributed computing on unreliable radio channels
Proceedings of the 2009 MobiHoc S3 workshop on MobiHoc S3
Adversarial Multiple Access Channel with Individual Injection Rates
OPODIS '09 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
Securing every bit: authenticated broadcast in radio networks
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Consensus and mutual exclusion in a multiple access channel
DISC'09 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Distributed computing
Anti-jamming broadcast communication using uncoordinated spread spectrum techniques
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Medium access control for adversarial channels with jamming
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
How efficiently can a malicious device disrupt a single-hop wireless network? Imagine two honest players attempting to exchange information in the presence of a malicious adversary that can disrupt communication by jamming or overwriting messages. Assume the adversary has a broadcast budget of @b-unknown to the honest players. We show that communication can be delayed for 2@b+@Q(lg|V|) rounds, where V is the set of values that the honest players may transmit. We then derive, via reduction to this 3-player game, round complexity lower bounds for several classical n-player problems: 2@b+@W(lg|V|) for reliable broadcast, 2@b+@W(logn) for leader election, and 2@b+@W(klg|V|/k) for static k-selection. We also consider an extension of our adversary model that includes up to t crash failures. Here we show a bound of 2@b+@Q(t) rounds for binary consensus. We provide tight, or nearly tight, upper bounds for all four problems. From these results we can derive bounds on the efficiency of malicious disruption, stated in terms of two new metrics: jamming gain (the ratio of rounds delayed to adversarial broadcasts) and disruption-free complexity (the rounds required to terminate in the special case of no disruption). Two key conclusions of this study: (1) all the problems considered feature semantic vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to disrupt termination more efficiently than simple jamming (i.e., all have a jamming gain greater than 1); and (2) for all the problems considered, the round complexity grows linearly with the number of bits to be communicated (i.e., all have a @W(lg|V|) or @W(lgn) disruption-free complexity.)