Inefficiency of Nash equilibria
Mathematics of Operations Research
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Selfish routing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2001
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Efficient methods for selfish network design
Theoretical Computer Science
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We investigate the impact of Stackelberg routing to reduce theprice of anarchy in network routing games. In this setting, anα fraction of the entire demand is first routed centrallyaccording to a predefined Stackelberg strategy and the remainingdemand is then routed selfishly by (nonatomic) players. Althoughseveral advances have been made recently in proving thatStackelberg routing can in fact significantly reduce the price ofanarchy for certain network topologies, the central question ofwhether this holds true in general is still open. We answer thisquestion negatively. We prove that the price of anarchy achievablevia Stackelberg routing can be unbounded even for single-commoditynetworks. In light of this negative result, we consider bicriteriabounds. We develop an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategythat induces a flow whose cost is at most the cost of an optimalflow with respect to demands scaled by a factor of $1 +\sqrt{1-\alpha}$. Finally, we analyze the effectiveness of aneasy-to-implement Stackelberg strategy, called SCALE. We provebounds for a general class of latency functions that includespolynomial latency functions as a special case. Our analysis isbased on an approach which is simple, yet powerful enough to obtain(almost) tight bounds for SCALE in general networks. This work wassupported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).