Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Multi-agent learning for engineers
Artificial Intelligence
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
An overview of pricing concepts for broadband IP networks
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
A market managed multi-service Internet (M3I)
Computer Communications
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
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Network formation games capture two conflicting objectives of self-interested nodes in a network. On one hand, such a node wishes to be able to reach all other nodes in the network; on the other hand, it wishes to minimize its cost of participation. We focus on myopic dynamics in a class of such games inspired by transportation and communication models. A key property of the dynamics we study is that they are local : nodes can only deviate to form links with others in a restricted neighborhood. Despite this locality, we find that our dynamics converge to efficient or nearly efficient outcomes in a range of settings of interest.