Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2001
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Fast Convergence to Wardrop Equilibria by Adaptive Sampling Methods
SIAM Journal on Computing
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We study taxes in the well-known game theoretic traffic model due to Wardrop. Given a network and a subset of edges, on which we can impose taxes, the problem is to find taxes inducing an equilibrium flow of minimal network-wide latency cost. If all edges are taxable, then marginal cost pricing is known to induce the socially optimal flow for arbitrary multi-commodity networks. In contrast, if only a strict subset of edges is taxable, we show NP-hardness of finding optimal taxes for general networks with linear latency functions and two commodities. On the positive side, for single-commodity networks with parallel links and linear latency function, we provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding optimal taxes.