Stable Internet routing without global coordination
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
The stable paths problem and interdomain routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Strategic Network Formation through Peering and Service Agreements
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands
Theory of Computing Systems
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In the Internet, Autonomous Systems (ASes) make contracts called Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between each other to transit one another's traffic. ASes also try to control the routing of traffic to and from their networks in order to achieve efficient use of their infrastructure and to attempt to meet some level of quality of service globally. We introduce a game theoretic model in order to gain understanding of this interplay between network formation and routing. Player strategies allow them to make contracts with one another to forward traffic, and to re-route traffic that is currently routed through them. This model extends earlier work of [3] that only considered the network formation aspect of the problem. We study the structure and quality of Nash equilibria and quantify the prices of anarchy and stability, that is, the relative quality of a centralized optimal solution versus that of the Nash equilibria.