Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial Auctions
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Greedy approximation via duality for packing, combinatorial auctions and routing
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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We introduce and study share-averse auctions , a class of auctions with allocation externalities, in which items can be allocated to arbitrarily many bidders, but the valuation of each individual bidder decreases as the items get allocated to more other bidders. For single-item auctions where players have incomplete information about each others' valuation, we characterize the truthful mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue, and analyze it for some interesting cases. We then move beyond single-item auctions, and analyze single-minded combinatorial auctions. We derive sufficient conditions for a truthful allocation in this setting. We also obtain a $\sqrt{m}$-approximation algorithm for maximizing social welfare, which is essentially tight unless P=NP.