ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The PERMIS X.509 role based privilege management infrastructure
Future Generation Computer Systems - Special section: Selected papers from the TERENA networking conference 2002
A Community Authorization Service for Group Collaboration
POLICY '02 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY'02)
Certificate-based authorization policy in a PKI environment
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The Grid 2: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure
The Grid 2: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure
Trust-X: A Peer-to-Peer Framework for Trust Establishment
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
TOWER: Practical Trust Negotiation Framework for Grids
E-SCIENCE '06 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on e-Science and Grid Computing
Trust Negotiation in Identity Management
IEEE Security and Privacy
Optimizing Peer Relationships in a Super-Peer Network
ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
ChinaGrid: making grid computing a reality
ICADL'04 Proceedings of the 7th international Conference on Digital Libraries: international collaboration and cross-fertilization
A constellation model for grid resource management
APPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Advanced Parallel Processing Technologies
Large-Scale Biomedical Image Analysis in Grid Environments
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
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Automated Trust Negotiation (ATN) is a promising approach to allowing strangers to access sensitive services in open environments. Although many ATN systems are proposed, some issues still remain to be addressed: 1) they are centralized and cannot scale well; and 2) their policy languages are coarse-grained. To address the above problems and secure grids, we present a novel automated trust negotiation framework, FORT, to establish trust relationship between service providers and service requesters. FORT is decentralized, so it scales well. Furthermore, we utilize attribute constraints to refine its language. This paper implements FORT and designs experiments to evaluate its performance. Experimental results show that FORT can effectively protect sensitive services at the cost of little performance of systems and scale well.