On social laws for artificial agent societies: off-line design
Artificial Intelligence - Special volume on computational research on interaction and agency, part 2
An Architecture for Autonomous Normative Agents
ENC '04 Proceedings of the Fifth Mexican International Conference in Computer Science
An architecture of a normative system: counts-as conditionals, obligations and permissions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanisms for norm emergence in multiagent societies
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Introduction to the special issue on normative multiagent systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Emergence of norms through social learning
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Role model based mechanism for norm emergence in artificial agent societies
COIN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems III
Identifying conditional norms in multi-agent societies
COIN@AAMAS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Coordination, organizations, institutions, and norms in agent systems
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The advent of virtual environments such as SecondLife call for a distributed approach for norm emergence and spreading. In open virtual environments, monitoring various interacting agents (avatars), using a centralized authority might be computationally expensive. The number of possible states and actions of an agent could be huge. An approach for sustaining order and smoother functioning of these environments can be facilitated through norms. Agents can generate norms based on interactions. In particular, those social norms that incur certain cost to an individual agent but benefit the whole society are more interesting than those benefit both the agent and the society. The problem is that the selfish agents might not be willing to share the norm adherence cost. In this work, we experiment with notion proposed by Axelrod that social norms are best at preventing small defections where the cost of enforcement is low. We also study how common knowledge can be used to facilitate the overall benefit of the society. We believe our work can be used to facilitate norm emergence in virtual online societies.