Recent directions in netlist partitioning: a survey
Integration, the VLSI Journal
On power-law relationships of the Internet topology
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Handbook of Graphs and Networks: From the Genome to the Internet
Handbook of Graphs and Networks: From the Genome to the Internet
A linear-time heuristic for improving network partitions
DAC '82 Proceedings of the 19th Design Automation Conference
Tolerance of intentional attacks in complex communication networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Recent research results show that some most important complex communication systems, which usually can be modeled as scale-free networks with a power-law nodal degree distribution, may be fragile under intentional attacks that take down network hubs. We study the robustness of these networks under deliberate attacks which remove network links. Specifically, we evaluate the extreme case where an efficient graph-partitioning algorithm is applied, based on accurate network-topology information, to decide on the links to be removed. Simulation results show that even such type of calculated link-removal attack cannot easily split a complex communication network. Moreover, among the two split parts, the larger one generally remains as a scale-free network with a very small network diameter. We also consider the case where a specific set of nodes have to be split away from the major part of the network. Simulation results show that applying a graph-partitioning algorithm generally does not lead to a significantly more cost-effective solution than simply removing the given set of nodes together with the links connected to them.