A Specification and Verification Method for Preventing Denial of Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency
Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
A Formal Framework and Evaluation Method for Network Denial of Service
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Game-Based Analysis of Denial-of-Service Prevention Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
VESTA: A Statistical Model-checker and Analyzer for Probabilistic Systems
QEST '05 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Quantitative Evaluation of Systems
Semantic foundations for generalized rewrite theories
Theoretical Computer Science
A foundation for tunnel-complex protocols
A foundation for tunnel-complex protocols
PMaude: Rewrite-based Specification Language for Probabilistic Object Systems
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A probabilistic formal analysis approach to cross layer optimization in distributed embedded systems
FMOODS'07 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal methods for open object-based distributed systems
All about maude - a high-performance logical framework: how to specify, program and verify systems in rewriting logic
Specification and analysis of distributed object-based stochastic hybrid systems
HSCC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Hybrid Systems: computation and control
On statistical model checking of stochastic systems
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
PRISM: a tool for automatic verification of probabilistic systems
TACAS'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
Model-checking DoS amplification for VoIP session initiation
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
PVESTA: a parallel statistical model checking and quantitative analysis tool
CALCO'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algebra and coalgebra in computer science
Stable availability under denial of service attacks through formal patterns
FASE'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering
Adaptive selective verification: an efficient adaptive countermeasure to thwart DoS attacks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The rewriting logic semantics project: A progress report
Information and Computation
Taming distributed system complexity through formal patterns
Science of Computer Programming
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The Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) protocol was recently proposed as an effective and efficient DoS countermeasure within the shared channel model, in which clients and attackers probabilistically share communication bandwidth with the server. ASV has been manually shown to satisfy some desirable availability and bandwidth consumption properties. Due to the probabilistic nature of the protocol and its underlying attacker model, it is intrinsically difficult to build a faithful model of the protocol with which one may automatically verify its properties. This paper fills the gap between manual analysis and simulation-based experimental analysis of ASV, through automated formal analysis. We describe a formal model of ASV using probabilistic rewrite theories, implemented in a probabilistic extension of Maude, and show how it can be used to formally verify various characteristics of ASV through automated statistical quantitative model checking analysis techniques. In particular, we formally verify ASV's connection confidence theorem and a slightly more general bandwidth consumption theorem of ASV. This is followed by a statistical comparison of ASV with non-adaptive selective verification protocols. We conclude with remarks on possible further development and future work.