The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable off-line cash in wallet with observers
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Accountable-subgroup multisignatures: extended abstract
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Secure and Efficient Off-Line Digital Money (Extended Abstract)
ICALP '93 Proceedings of the 20th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Provably Secure Blind Signature Schemes
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Provably secure electronic cash based on blind multisignature schemes
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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Although a great deal of research has been done on electronic cash schemes with blind multisignatures to prevent an insider attack, there is no discussion of a formal security model in the literature. Firstly we discussed the security model of e-cash schemes based on the blind multisignature scheme against a (restricted) attack model and proposed a concrete scheme proven to be secure in the model [1]; however, this attack model disallows an attacker from corrupting an issuing bank and shops in the forgery game. In this paper, first, we reconsider the security model to remove the restriction of the attack model. Second, we propose a new untraceable e-cash scheme with a blind multisignature scheme and prove that the proposed scheme is secure against the (non-restricted) attacks under the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.