Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Replicator Dynamics with Dynamic Payoff Reallocation Based on the Government's Payoff
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
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In a community which consists of a large number of people interacting with each other, social dilemma is an important problem. This problem occurs when the payoff of each person conflicts with the total payoff of the community which he/she belongs to. Evolutionary game theory has been used as a powerful mathematical framework to analyze such a social problem. Recently, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable goal state by using collections and reallocations of payoffs. In this paper, we investigate this model, and show conditions for the goal state to be a locally or a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point, respectively. We also propose a government's strategy depends on population states which can stabilize the goal state globally.