How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SIAM Journal on Computing
Separating Random Oracle Proofs from Complexity Theoretic Proofs: The Non-committing Encryption Case
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Towards Realizing Random Oracles: Hash Functions That Hide All Partial Information
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure hash-and-sign signatures without the random oracle
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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Canetti et al. [5] showed that there exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the random oracle (RO) model, but for which any implementation of the RO (by a single function or a function ensemble) results in insecure schemes. Their result greatly motivates the design of cryptographic schemes that are secure in the standard computational model. This paper gives some new results on the RO methodology. First, we give the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a signature scheme that is secure in the RO model but where, for any implementation of the RO, the resulting scheme is insecure. Next, we show that this condition induces a signature scheme that is insecure in the RO model, but that there is an implementation of the RO that makes the scheme secure.