Forward and backward simulations I.: untimed systems
Information and Computation
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Functional Programming, Concurrency, Simulation and Automated Reasoning: International Lecture Series 1991-1992, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Theorem-proving anonymity of infinite-state systems
Information Processing Letters
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Probabilistic anonymity via coalgebraic simulations
ESOP'07 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Programming
On Backward-Style Anonymity Verification
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
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The use of a formal method is a promising approach to developing reliable computer programs. This paper presents a formal method for anonymity, which is an important security property of communication protocols with regard to a user's identity. When verifying the anonymity of security protocols, we need to consider the presence of adversaries. To formalize stronger adversaries, we introduce an adversary model for simulation-based anonymity proof. This paper also demonstrates the formal verification of a communication protocol. We employ Crowds, which is an implementation of an anonymous router, and verify its anonymity. After describing Crowds in a formal specification language, we prove its anonymity with a theorem prover.