Secure group communications using key graphs
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protocol design for scalable and reliable group rekeying
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Toward resilient security in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Fault-Tolerant Cluster-Wise Clock Synchronization for Wireless Sensor Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
On supporting distributed collaboration in sensor networks
MILCOM'03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE conference on Military communications - Volume II
Review: Dynamic key management in wireless sensor networks: A survey
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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When a sensor network is deployed in a hostile environment, an adversary may launch such attacks as eavesdropping the communications and compromising sensor nodes. Using the compromised nodes, he may inject false sensing reports or modify the reports sent by other nodes. To defend against these attacks, researchers have proposed symmetric group key-based schemes. In these schemes, however, if a large number of nodes are compromised, many (sub)group keys will be revealed. This greatly endangers the filtering schemes, making them very ineffective or even useless. To address this problem, we propose a family of predistribution and local collaboration-based group rekeying (PCGR) schemes, which update the compromised group keys to prevent the compromised nodes from understanding the communications between noncompromised nodes or injecting false data. These schemes are designed based on a simple while controversial idea - preload future group keys into sensor nodes before their deployment. To protect the preloaded keys from being disclosed by compromised nodes, we propose a novel technique that requires neighboring nodes to collaborate to derive the future group keys. To the best of our knowledge, our schemes are the first set of distributed group rekeying schemes for sensor networks without involving online key servers. Extensive analysis and simulations are conducted to evaluate the proposed schemes, and the results show that the proposed schemes can achieve a good level of security, outperform several previous group rekeying schemes, and significantly improve the effectiveness of false data filtering.