Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
TrustGuard: countering vulnerabilities in reputation management for decentralized overlay networks
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
Impeding attrition attacks in P2P systems
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Defending against eclipse attacks on overlay networks
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Fireflies: scalable support for intrusion-tolerant network overlays
Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2006
A survey of peer-to-peer security issues
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A taxonomy of rational attacks
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Secure routing strategies in DHT-based systems
Globe'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Data management in grid and peer-to-peer systems
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Distributed hash tables (DHTs) provide efficient and scalable lookup mechanisms for locating data in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. Several issues, however, prevent DHT-based p2p networks from being widely deployed -- one of which is security. Malicious peers may modify, drop, misroute lookup requests, or even collude to deny the availability of target data. To address these security concerns, we propose an extension to Chord named Sechord. The main idea is that the source can determine whether the next hop is valid or invalid by estimating how far the next hop is from its finger pointer. If the next hop is too far away from the finger pointer, especially compared to the average distance between two consecutive peers, the source can infer some ongoing malicious activities. Our modifications require no trust between two nodes except node join. Moreover, each node utilizes locally available information to evaluate hops encountered during the lookup routing process for validity. These modifications have been implemented and evaluated in the presence of malicious nodes. Our results show that Sechord significantly enhances the security of structured p2p systems at the expense of slightly increased hop count.