SQLProb: a proxy-based architecture towards preventing SQL injection attacks

  • Authors:
  • Anyi Liu;Yi Yuan;Duminda Wijesekera;Angelos Stavrou

  • Affiliations:
  • George Mason University;George Mason University;George Mason University;George Mason University

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

SQL injection attacks (SQLIAs) consist of maliciously crafted SQL inputs, including control code, used against Database-connected Web applications. To curtail the attackers' ability to generate such attacks, we propose an SQL Proxy-based Blocker (SQLProb). SQLProb harnesses the effectiveness and adaptivity of genetic algorithms to dynamically detect and extract users' inputs for undesirable SQL control sequences. Compared to state-of-the-art protection mechanisms, our method does not require any code changes on either the client, the web-server or the back-end database. Rather, our system uses a proxy that seamlessly integrates with existing operational environments offering protection to front-end web servers and back-end databases. To evaluate the overhead and the detection performance of our system, we implemented a prototype of SQLProb which we tested using real SQL attacks. Our experimental results show that we can detect all SQL injection attacks while maintaining very low resource utilization.